| Introduction to Buddhism | ||||||||||||||||
| Introduction to Buddhism |
The Four Noble Truths: Suffering
Most of these answers however are based on revelation or are the result of philosophical speculation, and therefore not entirely satisfactory. Together with some other ‘sramanistic’ movements, the Buddha tried to find an answer in the more direct world of experience. If it could not be proven, than at least it could be shown. Here however, the Buddha differs from other sramanistic schools (Lokayata, Ajivika, Ajñanavada, and Jaina) in that he consequently relied on empirical and psychological data. This implies that his Teaching should primarily be seen as an empirical science. We should never lose sight of the fact that Buddhism is an epistemology rather than a metaphysical system, and that it certainly has no concern whatsoever with ontology. The purpose [of the Teaching] is not to give and explanation of ‘being’, but to free one from suffering. Suffering is an existential problem, not an ontological one. The whole existential experience is characterized by suffering in one way or another. ‘Life’ itself is not necessarily suffering, life an-sich is actually neutral; but its main characteristic towards existential beings is the experience of suffering. There where Brahmins tried to explain suffering by way of metaphysical constructions (such as e.g. the separation of atman/brahman), the Buddha gave a psychological meaning to suffering. Suffering is an experience inherent to existence; the source of suffering lies within the world of experience. Suffering is proper (Latin proprius) to the psyche. Thus the Buddha locates the origin of suffering within the suffering being itself, and not outside it! Suffering is – among other things – characterized by factors that are inherent to our bodily appearance: birth, sickness, old age and death. More ‘real’, more essential however, are the ‘inner’ forms of suffering in existence: sorrow, lamentation, fear, pain, misery, despair, etc. In the terminology of modern psychology we could add to the list: frustration, inhibition, stress, angst, etc. Probably the nearest approximation to the term duhkha is ‘unsatisfactoriness’, ‘unrest’, ‘unease’, ‘dissatisfaction’. Traditionally the content of suffering is described as follows:
To have what one does not desire
To lose the good that one already has
Longing for the good that one does not yet have
To fear losing the good that one has Buddhism does not negate ‘joy’ or ‘happiness’, but emphasizes their dependence on longing or fear, i.e. on desire. Desire can never be fulfilled because every desiring subject and every desired object are anicca, i.e. impermanent, subject to change, transient. Because of this, every joy is carrying within itself the inevitable potentiality of suffering. The impermanence of things is the ‘seed of suffering’: it is one of its first symptoms. Why are things impermanent? All things are composite, put together: samskara.
Every thing is a composite structure, a mere aggregate of constituent parts: dharmas. Dharmas in their turn do not exist by or through themselves, but can only exist within a relational structure, i.e. linked to other dharmas. Dharmas are concepts, manageable in connection to other concepts. As empirical units of experience they miss substance. They exist only in relation to other concepts. They are anatta: non-self [selfless]. This anatta-characteristic pertains to everything that exists: just as much for ‘death matter’ as for ‘living beings’. We thus live in an empirical world, conceptually built up from a phenomenal, fragmented world in which both the one who experiences and that which is experienced – including the experience itself – are compound. With this the Buddha negates the existence of a metaphysical entity called ‘soul’, ‘ego’, ‘atman’, thus breaking with the whole of Indian tradition. Only the Lokayata (materialists) have taken a similar point of view, be it with other consequences. When neither samskara (forms of existence) nor dharma (elements of existence) possess a permanent entity, an atman (substance, self or ego), then the question arises: Who then is it that suffers?
All things are composite. In Buddhism ‘personality’ is reduced to a psychological convergence of experiential levels. Each of these levels in its turn is presented as the resultant of structures without proper substance (i.e. independent, ontological, absolute character). They acquire meaning by converging (i.e. being dependent upon, being in function of) with other structures. This convergence of structures, which forms what we call ‘personality’, is termed pañcaskandha. The Pañcaskandha (The Five Aggregates) (pañca: five; skandha or P khanda: group, aggregate, bundle) Taken together, these ‘five groups of existence’ form the existential personality called namarupa.
Nama:
‘name’, psychic and mental factors The groups of existence all stand in connection to sense-experiences. The senses are the gates through which the exterior world ‘flows in’: thus they are the starting point of all experience and knowledge. Traditional Indian thought knows six senses: sadayatana.
Which are the pañcaskandha? 1. Rupa: form, corporeality, sense-experiences. Rupa or ‘form’ is the direct sensation, the establishment of that what we experience as corporeal (‘Gestalt’): the phenomenal world as it is experienced by contact with the senses. Through corporeality we are introduced into the world that surrounds us. In rupa the objective world of existence is transposed into our phenomenal world. Rupa becomes the primary experiential data through the interplay of the ‘four elements’: mahabhutani (substance, existence as it is perceived).
2. Vedana: feeling, sensation, perception The activity of the senses on a mental and physical level: the receiving of signals from the sense organs. This perception already has a distinct character: the sensation is immediately ‘colored’. Perception is experienced as being ‘pleasant’, ‘unpleasant’ or ‘neutral’ and consequently provokes a certain reaction. Perception is nourished with one of the ‘three poisons’:
3. Samjña: (P. sañña) thought, conception, discrimination, discernment When perception is processed further in the mind we arrive at conceptualization, the construction of thoughts, concepts and ideas about things in the exterior world. This mental function is responsible for the formation of images (Vorstellungen) of objects. In this ‘imagination’, there are ‘home-made’ criteria present by which we discern one thing from another (i.e. classification system). 4. Samskara: (P. sankhara) karma-formations, mental activity, volition. The activities of the mind are causing psychic reactions to that which has entered through perception. A process of forming dual distinctions such as liking/not liking, good/bad, etc. arises. Samskaras have two aspects: [2]
In our mind they form the ‘link’ between past and future. Samskaras are thought-constructions arising from experience and give rise to valuation. Because of this the phenomenon of ‘act-in-itself’ is abandoned: a new aspect is added through which the moral emphasis comes to lie on our ‘attitude’ towards this act. Through this samskara becomes as it were the organ that discriminates (valuates) and, in consequence, provokes a volitional reaction (as the fruition of desire, aversion or illusion). Therefore volitional activity (karma) is often referred to as the main vector of samskara. Samskara is the ‘energetic aggregate’ that leads to the creation and maintenance of self-consciousness (“I want to be I”). It is this volitional activity that keeps the ‘stream of existence’ flowing. KarmaThe group of samskara is especially important in relation to the principle of karma: here karma receives its typical Buddhist character, namely that it takes place on the level of volitional activity. Karma (activity, action, deed, and not fruition – i.e. result of karma - as is often thought!) is neither a forcing mechanism, nor a blind fate. It is an internal situation out of which – in principle – every being can act ‘freely’. Karma is a moral mental principle. Its quality however is not determined by concepts such as good or evil: these are judgments based on premises. Karma can have three characteristics or directions:
The wholesome does not necessarily imply what is conceived as “good” as an ethical factor. The norms for value judgments are differing. In this way the ‘sinner’ is not ‘evil’ but ‘wrong or mistaken’. ‘Sin’ is not a violation of a command or interdiction, but a mistake resulting from and conditioned by ignorance. 5. Vijñana: (P. viññana) consciousness, cognition, intellectuation. Mental function that stands in relation to cognition and re-cognition of that which is experienced. Intellectuation: intake of empirical data in the intellect. This appears as “the known” in our mind. Vijñana colors the experienced, and thus also the karma-formations, as kusala (wholesome) or akusala (unwholesome). Vijñana comprises almost all forms of consciousness acknowledged by Western psychology: consciousness, ego-consciousness, superconsciousness, subconsciousness, unconsciousness, collective unconscious, etc. Vijñana is primarily the consciousness content: it functions as a database, as a software memorizing data. In vijñana there is both the awareness of the other skandhas (object-aspect) and the awareness of ‘being-conscious’ (subject-aspect). From this duality arises the notion of self-existence: consciousness becomes conscious of its “own-being” (= ego-consciousness). With the possibility to discriminate present, it is at this mental level that the distinction between subject/object arises. Vijñana is the creative factor in the ‘ego-illusion’ and is thus ‘chief-responsible’ for suffering. The structure of consciousness is very complex and stands in relation to:
Mano-vijñana (thought-consciousness) Through thought-consciousness arises ego-consciousness: here manas (mind) has an ego-function, namely personality. When we imagine the five skandhas as segments of a circle overlapping each other, then we can state that the central part - where these five meet and merge – is manas. Without the five skandhas, manas would not exist. Manas does not exist in itself. From manas originates the fundamental thought-error (namely ego-thought) that lies at the basis of suffering. Manas is in fact the nucleus of the fundamental illusion. [1] “To fear” is to be interpreted as a negative form of “longing” or “desiring” [2] The term ‘samskara’ as a ‘group of existence’ should not be confused with samskara as ‘karma-formation’; both are however related. The first can be considered as ‘static’, namely ‘having been formed’; the second can be considered as ‘dynamic’: namely ‘the forming’. |
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Contemplating
the problem of suffering is not peculiar to Buddhism. The problem of
suffering is encountered in every human system of thought, yet, we have to
ascertain that early Indian thought has specifically focused on this
question and has provided us with a variety of answers. 