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Buddhist Philosophy

Madhyamaka and Nagarjuna

The philosopher Nagarjuna is the first Buddhist thinker with a vision that transcends the "theological" i.e. the Abhidharmic. He implements the convergence of the various Mahayana-streams and unites them in one coherent system, without neglecting elements from Hinayana-literature.

The starting point of his philosophy is the return to the main tenets of the Teaching as they were proclaimed by Gautama Buddha, thereby thoroughly rejecting the Abhidharmic elaboration. His basic point of view is - just as the historical Buddha's view - mainly empirical, epistemological and not ontological (as e.g. De la Vallee Poussin and partially also Stcherbatsky had claimed), emphasizing the 4th lemma of the Logical Tetralemma (see before), by which it obtains a negative aspect.

His point of view is that the Mahayana-acquisitions continue the original themes of the Middle Way (Madhyamaka is the equivalent of Madhyama-pratipad).

Biography: Legend has made itself master of Nagarjuna's biography and is therefore highly unreliable. He is supposed to have lived during the 2nd or 3rd century, as a Brahmin or the son of a Brahmin, in the Middle and/or Southern India. It is even suspected that several "Nagarjuna's" are processed in the legend. Nagarjuna ('snake-white') is a very common name in India.

Works: A great number of works are attributed to Nagarjuna, but textual criticism (already in India, China and Tibet) has rejected the authorship by Nagarjuna of several of these works.

According to the latest research results1 the following works could be authentic:

Mula-madyamika-karika
Sunyata-saptati
Vaidalya-prakarana
Catuh-stava
Suhrillekha
Yukti-sastika
Vigraha-vyavartani
Ratnavali
Pratitya-samutpada-hridaya
Sutrasamuccaya

Some important other works attributed to Nagarjuna are less certain, e.g. Maha-prajñaparamita-sastra and Dasabhumika-vibhasa. All other works are unanimously considered to be inauthentic.

Controversy: Nagarjuna, Hinayana or Mahayana?

Nagarjuna reverts to what he sees as the original teaching of the Buddha, and certainly not to the 'Hinayana'-developments of it. It is by means of original data that he systematizes the pre-Mahayana and Mahayana themes and that he refutes the propositions characteristic for the Sarvastivada and Sautrantika-schools.

We can thus determine notable differences between Nagarjuna and the traditional Hinayana doctrines. So, e.g. Nagarjuna emphasizes sunyata (emptiness) over anatmya (P. anatta - non-self); he posits dharma-sunyata instead of dharma-svabhava (Sarvastivada) and pudgala-sunyata (Sarvastivada, Sautrantika, Theravada).

Yet, it is claimed by some that Nagarjuna is not a "factual Mahayanist" (Warder), or even that he is a Theravadin (Kalupahana). Against these opinions we can bring up the following arguments:

The presupposition that only the Pali-canon reflects the 'original' Teaching of the Buddha cannot be maintained. The final redaction of that Canon dates from Buddhaghosa, ± 2 centuries after Nagarjuna.
Kalupahana's argument that in MMK only the Katyayanavada is mentioned as a reference; and that this agama appears in the Pali-canon as Kaccayanagotta-sutta, is not convincing, since that same text is also found in the Chinese ("Mahayna") canon.
Kalupahana states that "Assuming that Nagarjuna was a Mahayanist and, therefore, must have rejected any literature that came to be preserved by the Sthaviravadins,...). This is contrary to the reality that Mahayana has integrally absorbed the Hinayana-texts into its own scriptural canons.
Nagarjuna introduces - also in his MMK - themes that are completely strange to both the Pali-canon and the Hinayana-tradition, e.g. upaya (expedient means) or the Three Levels of Truth with the impossibility to attain absolute truth by way of discursive thought.
The traditional transmission within Hinayana rejects the propositions of Nagarjuna (not withstanding the influence they had on their teachings); in Mahayana on the other hand, Nagarjuna is looked upon as the 'second Buddha' who "set the Wheel of the Dharma in motion for the second time." In some cases Nagarjuna was even deified !
We should not take MMK out of the context of other undeniably Nagarjunian works, but should recognize their mutual interrelation.

Nagarjuna is without doubt the systematizer of the Mahayana and the starting point of Mahayana philosophy. This is probably why J. Takakusu in his 'Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy' describes Madhyamaka as 'Quasi-Mahayana'.

It is generally accepted that Nagarjuna was especially inspired by the Prajñaparamita literature. This is undeniably so, but also a link with the Avatamsaka way of thinking can not be denied. Typically 'Nagarjunian' sayings can often be found in the Garland-Sutra, e.g. :

"Samsara and nirvana are both ungraspable. Deceiving teachers preach a difference between samsara and nirvana."

Or,

"The bodhisattva clearly sees that all existence has only a non-self nature and therefore he understands that it is completely empty and without substance. There is neither body, nor is there no-body, neither thought nor no-thought. There is neither being nor no-being. The entire existence is without possession and without being. It is neither being nor no-being."

One cannot get more 'Nagarjunian' than this...

Emptiness, Concepts and the knowledge of Truth.

Already the historical Buddha stated that:

all forms of existence are characterized by unsatisfactoriness;
all forms of existence are characterized by impermanence;
all elements of existence are characterized by non-self.

Within the existential experience we can therefore not speak of permanent or autonomous values.

But how then should we interpret this existential experience?
In Buddhist terms this is samsara, the 'world of suffering'. 'To exist' is what each separate being perceives for itself. Existence is that which takes place - again for each separate being - between the moment that has passed and the moment that is not yet here, i.e. the transitional process from past (karma = the acts of the past) towards future (phala = karmic results). The present therefore is always a 'becoming'. This 'becoming' is none other than pratitya samutpada, namely, a process of causal conditions.

That which is 'true' therefore remains beyond being (permanence) and non-being (annihilation).

Nagarjuna consequently extends this train of thought.

He calls this 'neither being nor non-being' sunyata (empti-ness). Emptiness is not a negative concept (as in 'nothing'), but affirms the possibility, in function of eventual relational conditions, of manifesting all imaginable characteristics.

Since all that is knowable (the phenomenal world) is 'empty', also all our knowing which is made relative by the relation (subject/object) is 'empty'. We reduce the perception into elementary concepts (dharmas), who in their turn can be again regarded as cognitive objects. Nagarjuna stresses the 'emptiness' of each dharma on every level of our cognitive abilities.

Concepts (dharmas) are empty, i.e. without substance. Our discursive thought, which uses language to attach concepts to what is perceived, is therefore irrelevant when it comes to adequately knowing reality in-itself, i.e. independent from perception.3

The only thing that can be said with sense, is that all experience and expression of that experience, is 'emptiness'. 'Emptiness' is, where our powers of cognition are concerned, the only reality that all things (subjects and objects) have in common.

But also this concept of 'emptiness' is 'empty' and in the final analysis irrelevant - yet, it remains the ultimate point of what is expressible.

Conceptual thought is necessarily dualistic since - when reduced to its simplest expression - it can only exists in the mutual relationship of a 'conceiver' (as subject) and a 'concept' (as object). Neither 'conceiver' nor 'concept' can be regarded as separate entities. By way of discursive thought, which works with concepts and their language expressions, we therefore can never go beyond what is relative (or relational).

Here, Nagarjuna manifests himself clearly as an empirical epistemologist. He comes to the conclusion that there are three levels of truth. The first two are mutually related and form a bivalence: something is untrue/something is true. Which gives us:

asatya - untruth (lie or mistake), e.g. "a hare has horns"
loka-samvriti-satya - 'world speech truth', 'relative truth', e.g. "a hare does not have horns"

the third level of truth is non-conceptual :
paramartha-satya - 'ultimate truth, absolute truth'. Since this third level can neither be conceptual nor discursive, it is a truth which is inconceivable and inexpressible.

Traditionally these three levels of truth are illustrated by the metaphor of the snake :

At dusk a man walks along a path in the forest. Suddenly on the road in front of him he sees a snake. He is terrified and runs off. Next morning he walks the same path and discovers that what he took to be a snake is, in broad daylight, just a rope.

the perceived 'snake' is untruth
the 'snake that is a rope' is a relative truth.

Nagarjuna adds to this that both 'rope' and 'snake' are only concepts and concludes:
in 'absolute truth' there exist neither snake nor rope, only the empty concepts of them.

Concepts that are untruth, belong to the world of ego-illusion (aham iti = I am) and are characterized by ego-thought:

subject 'untrue' object 'untrue'

Concepts that are relative truth, are forms of expression from a non-ego perspective. They are 'true' in the system in which they appear:

subject 'untrue' object 'true'

Concepts can never be 'absolute truth', since on this level every duality falls away. Every knowledge of absolute truth therefore has to be non-conceptual i.e. 'im-mediate' (without mediator)

In the forms of mediate knowledge, which makes use of ideas, thoughts, words, etc., things are only knowable as concepts, i.e. within the relations in which they appear. Subject and object are reducible to dharmas, thus, 'emptiness' is the only 'true' nature we can attribute to them.

Where there is dualism present, the "true nature of things" or "true reality" remains beyond knowing; the "knower" - at best - remains at the level of relative truth.

Some examples of dualisms or dichotomies: good/evil, creator/creation, the Enlightened One/the foolish being, transcendent/immanent, suffering/joy, duality/unity, samsara/nirvana.

Applied in relation to the Buddhist teachings this gives:

untruth: adharma, the non-teaching
relative truth: buddhadharma, the teaching as it was proclaimed by the historical Buddha Sakyamuni.
absolute truth: saddharma, the Teaching seen beyond time and space.

What then, is the relation between the Four Noble Truths and the levels of truth established by Nagarjuna?

To the level of relative truth belong the first two Noble Truths (Suffering and the Cause of Suffering), since they take place on the samsaric level. They form as it where the transition from (a) to (b) and their result is relative knowledge (jñana: knowledge).

To the level of absolute truth belong the last two Noble Truths (Cessation of Suffering, and the Noble Eightfold Path), since they take place on the nirvanic oriented level. They form as it where the transition from (b) to (c), and their result is absolute knowledge (sarvajña: omniscience or prajña: wisdom).

We can note here that each of these transitions is nothing else than a process of dependent causation, which takes place according to the paradigm which is pratitya-samutpada.

Nagarjuna's point of departure is clearly negating. The introductory verses to his MMK e.g. are (from the Sanskrit Version):

"I salute him, the fully enlightened, the best of speakers, who preached the non-ceasing and the non-arising, the non-annihilation and the non-permanence, the non-identity and the non-difference, the non-appearance and the non-disappearance, the dependent arising, the appeasement of obsessions and the auspicious."

The Chinese translation of the introductory verses by Kumarajiva is even more powerful, and is known as the Eight Negations.

No Arising,
No Extinction,
No Annihilation,
No Permanence,
No Unity
No Diversity,
No Coming,
No Going.

Nagarjuna and Buddhist soteriology

Nagarjuna's thought reflects itself mainly on the soteriology. For, only this is truly important to the being subject to suffering, impermanence and delusion. In a nutshell we can say that Nagarjuna - just as the historical Buddha - was before all an empiricist and a pragmatic, whose goal it is to free man from [wrong] views.

The problem of conceptual dualism and the rejection of it has several consequences:

It is not through conceptual, discursive thought that Enlightenment can be realized. Intellectuality (including philosophy...) cannot offer a perspective on Enlightenment; only direct or immediate experience, among others on the meditative level, whereby the activity of the ego-forming consciousness (manas) is neutralized, offers access to absolute truth, which in turn stands for nirvana.
Good and evil are dualistic, i.e. relative concepts which can only be used on the level of relative truth. Salvation or Liberation lies beyond these concepts. Nagarjuna here emphasizes the subordinate function of morality and moral discipline (sila) in relation to the soteriology. He however underlines the input of concepts as 'wholesome' (kusala) and 'unwholesome' (akusala), certainly on the level of relative truth, as actions that are carried by the karmic law. This law stands in function of volition. In this perspective the pairs 'good' (punya) / 'wholesome' (kusala) and 'evil' (papa) / 'unwholesome' (akusala) are only 'expedient means' (upaya kausalya).
In the end, even samsara and nirvana are only concepts and therefore only applicable on a relative level, e.g. in relation to each other or in relation to the situation of the suffering being. Seen from the 'absolute', they are both sunyata, both with the identical characteristic of emptiness. Their difference resides in the wisdom-approach. As is stated in the MMK, XXV.19-205

There is no difference at all
Between Nirvana and Samsara,
There is no difference at all
Between Samsara and Nirvana.

What makes the limit of Nirvana
Is also then the limit of Samsara.
Between the two we cannot find
The slightest shade of difference.

Should therefore be seen in its proper context of MMK, XXV.23-24:

What is identity, and what is difference?
What is eternity what non-eternity?
What means eternity and non-eternity together?
What means negation of both issues?

The bliss consists in the cessation of all thought,
In the quiescence of Plurality.
No (separate) Reality was preached at all,
Nowhere and none by Buddha.

The difference and/or equality that we ascribe to samsara and nirvana are thus in no way to be interpreted as an ontological difference, as if this world of suffering would be different or identical to the world of enlightenment. Difference and/or equality are empirical, epistemological statements: we regard an eventual 'objective' world only through experiential data. Discriminating between, and conceptualizing about samsara and nirvana are therefore constructions of our consciousness and thus only valid on the level of relative truth.

Nagarjuna has prevented that Buddhism would end up as a static teaching. That risk was real, e.g. in the Sarvastivada school with its leaning towards scholasticism. Also, through relativating philosophical and even soteriological concepts (ideas) he has opened, from an originally a-metaphysical Buddhism, a way towards a wider - and in a certain sense even a metaphysical - research, even towards a so-called horizontal mysticism.

Through the rejection of all dogmatic interpretations he offers the Mahayana the possibility of numerous non-conflicting ways as long as they remain relative 'worldly speaking' expressions of a "inconceivable, unthinkable and inexpressible Teaching". It is therefore only fair that Nagarjuna is looked upon as a founder and patriarch by almost all Mahayana and Vajrayana schools, be it sometimes for quite different sayings from the Master.

It probably happens that an exclusively negativistic view is ascribed to Nagarjuna. This is however countered by his stand in relation to the possibilities that man is offered towards the realization of Enlightenment. Because what Nagarjuna has refuted in the first place is the possibility of realizing Enlightenment by way of conceptual thought.

Opposite to that however he puts the so-called Three Gates towards Liberation (trini vimoksa-mukhani, Ch. san-chieh-t'o-men, J. sangedatsumon), namely the meditations on:

emptiness (sunyata, Ch. k'ung, ku)
the non-substantiality of phenomena, their signlessness (animitta, Ch. wu-hsiang, J. muso)
the undesirability of things (apranihita, Ch. wu-yüan, J. mugan), i.e. the being-free of desire and meaning.

In this way Nagarjuna gives his philosophy a positive direction, even when this is aimed against conventional, worldly 'knowledge'. We could look for analogies in Lao-tzu.

Madhyamaka after Nagarjuna

Nagarjuna's way of thought was undoubtedly a great influence and has been carried on by a great number of philosophers after him. Thus it could be said that his philosophy (together with the Prajñaparamita-literature and the Lankavatara-sutra) has laid the foundation for the later Ch'an-schools, be it however with a strong influence from Taoism and Yogacara-thought. Yet, the impact of Nagarjuna goes further, and it is no miracle that he is recognized as a patriarch in practically all Mahayana-schools.

In the 5th century Madhyamaka was split up in two currents who each attempted to represent the 'true' Madhyamaka. It is undeniable that also the blooming of Buddhist Logic - e.g. Dinnaga7 - was unthinkable without the impulse given by Nagarjuna.

The two schools in which the Madhyamaka was divided are:

Svatantrika: 'School of the Independent Grounds', most known representative is Bhavaviveka (6th century). 'Svatantra' refers to a more positive position: the negations characteristic for Nagarjuna are exclusively the refutation of wrongly held views. The pratitya-samutpada is the middle position between affirmation and negation.
Prasangika: 'Teaching of the Undesired Outcome'. The origin of this school is attributed to Buddhapalita (5th century), but its most important exponent is without doubt Candrakirti (6th-7th century), also the most famous commentator on MMK. According to him Nagarjuna aimed at a polemic reductio ad absurdum, a demonstration that each statement, each conclusion must lead to the falling away of any/every presupposition. Emphasis is put on the pratitya samutpada as the proces of the origin of suffering. Often this school is associated with 'radical empiricism'. It is this current that has had the most success in China (thanks to Kumarajiva 344-413 and Chi-tsang 549-623). To this day it remains the dominating philosophy of the Tibetan Gelug-pa.

But also outside of Buddhism Madhyamaka had a great influence:

on Hinduism, and especially on the 'New Vedanta' (Nava-Vedanta) of Sankara (8th-9th century). Even a century earlier a certain Gaudapada was accused by Kumarila, a Mimansa-master, of conceding too much to Buddhism. Ramanuja (± 1050-1137), the main exponent of theistic Vedanta, accused even Sankara of being a crypto-Buddhist...
More recent however we can note the great interest of present-day philosophers and physicists for Madhyamaka. In this way, Nagarjuna had no small influence on existentialists such as Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger, or theoretical physicists such as Heisenberg and Schrodinger.