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Buddhist Philosophy
- Prelude
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Causality
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Diversification
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Nirvana
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Hinayana/Mahayana
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Madhyamaka and Nagarjuna
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Yogacara and Vasubandhu
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Avatamsaka - Hua-yen
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Buddhist Logic
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Buddhism in China
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Sukhavati: Pure Land Buddhism
- Kyoto
School of Philosophy
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Prelude
'Buddhist' = Peculiar to or
originated from the Teaching of the Buddha, in the manifold forms it
assumes, all however relating back to the same fundaments.
It will be more difficult to give a
definition or even a description of the term 'Philosophy'. It is however
very clear that 'philosophy' in its Western (viz. Greco-Christian) context
shows a different 'content' than that in the East (predominantly Indian
and/or Chinese). From almost every definition of philosophy it goes
to show that Western philosophy centers around the question of 'being',
the 'first (or last) cause' and the 'absolute'. It tries to find an
explanation, analyzes the experiential data and attempts to develop a
dialectic around it.
Western philosophy then will be mainly concerned with metaphysics, and
especially with ontological questions.
Another facet of Western philosophy (and mysticism) is that it places
itself outside the realm of religion, even in those cases where its use
lies in giving a coherent structure to religion (viz. Scholasticism).
In the East, philosophy endeavors
towards a coherent scheme around which multiple soteriological practices
can be weighed, evaluated and structured. The search here is not the
search for an explanation (the why-question) but for an efficiency (the
how-question). It is not so much the 'absolute truth' that counts, but the
effectiveness of a given system or practice.
It is therefore not the question of 'being' but the question of 'knowledge
and knowing' (epistemology versus ontology) (viz. Wisdom) that will be the
center of philosophical thought in the East. There is the search for
understanding the connections and inter-relationships between phenomena
and the ability to express them. It is an attempt to translate the
non-conceptual (meditative or mystical) into concepts and words, with the
clear purpose of describing the salvific process or way to liberation
(Enlightenment or Nirvana,...), without however confusing the
'description' with the 'described'.
Emphasis therefore is put on psychology and epistemology as the basis for
the development of a soteriology.
Thus, there is no search for the 'absolute' as there is in the West, but
an uninterrupted input of relativism and self-critique. It is therefore
the religious aspect that is dominant, integrating both philosophy and
mysticism. A non-religious philosophy, while characteristic for the West,
is conceived as an impossibility in the Eastern context. Even
Confucianism, with its initial rejection of all things supernatural takes
into account the concept of Heaven (T'ien) and its Virtue (working or
effectiveness).
A Buddhist 'philosophy' will make no exception to this rule.
Fundaments of Buddhism
The basic principles of the Teaching
of the Buddha are found within the Four Noble Truths :
- The Universality of Suffering
- The Cause of Suffering
- The Cessation of Suffering
- The Way that leads to the
Cessation of Suffering
(1) and (2) are situated mainly on the psychological level of the world of
experience. Both the 'inner' and 'outer' world are seen as nothing more
than a representation of the mind. Our knowledge originates in the
subject. Not the world is illusory, but the glasses through which I see
the world makes that the world as it appears to me is an ego-illusion.
If one looks at the meaning of these Four Noble Truths, one comes to the
conclusion that the first three Noble Truths point to a theoretical model
in which (1) can be taken as consensual, generally acceptable and not
necessarily Buddhist; while (2) and (3) are causal: (2) as the cause of
suffering, and (3) as the cause of the cessation of suffering. Truth (4)
on the contrary is typically Buddhist in its referral to a praxis.
The concept 'suffering' is usually misinterpreted, due to a Christian or
materialistic point of view. The term 'duhkha', although mostly translated
as 'suffering' reaches much further than our ordinary conception of the
term suffering: it implies not just our bodily or social torments or
vexations, but also - and primarily so - our mental torments. Therefore
duhkha would be better described as 'universal unsatisfactoriness' or
'dissatisfaction with the existing situation'.
In a certain sense we can also consult philosophers from the West for
possible 'better' translations of duhkha. John Locke 1 (1632-1704) speaks
of 'uneasiness', thereby remarking that this is the basic feeling, the
drive behind every thought or action of humanity. Also found are terms
such as 'Unerfülltheit' etc. It is through the use of these, that the term
'suffering' can be taken out of its physical-material context.
In a certain sense we could look upon the Buddhist concept of 'suffering'
as being the interval, the distance between the existentially experienced
and our expectations, on the one hand 'desire' and 'attachment', on the
other hand fear:
Suffering here, does not belong to the sphere of salvation or
enlightenment - as is often the case in other religions -, but is a
characteristic of the existential world in which existence unfolds. This
'suffering' stands loose from the sphere of nirvana : this becomes clear
although paradoxically expressed in the 'Heart-Sutra' ("Here, there is no
suffering, no cause of suffering, no cessation of suffering, no path that
leads to the cessation of suffering.").
Duhkha indeed is one of the universal characteristics of that which
exists, viz. the 'experienced'. As the locus typicus goes:
- All forms of existence are
characterized by suffering;
- All forms of existence are
characterized by impermanence;
- All elements of existence are
characterized by non-self.
The distinction between 'forms of
existence' and 'elements of existence' is of the utmost importance.
All 'things' or 'beings' are compound: these are the 'forms' that
existence takes on. (samskara = compound).
This 'compound' is characterized by its composing elements or components
(dharma = principle, basic principle, characteristic,...).
If one would use the example of computer science as a metaphor, one could
picture a dharma as corresponding to a unit of communication (bit) or a
unit of transmission (baud). Samskara than would correspond with a
'message' or 'data'.
Both samskara and dharma have in fact a multitude of meanings that are not
always clearly distinguishable. The Monier-Monier Williams
Sanskrit-English Dictionary for example gives the following lemma for 'samskara':
"...the faculty of memory, mental impression or recollection, impression
on the mind of acts done in a former state of existence. Buddh.: mental
conformation or creation of the mind (such as that of the external world,
regarded by it as real though actually non-existent...". In the Pali Text
Society Dictionary on the other hand we read for the same lemma: "1.
Aggregate of the conditions or essential properties of a given process or
result e.g. the essentials or 'elements' of anything; - essential
conditions, antecedents or synergy (co-ordinated activity), mental
coefficients, requisite for act, speech, thought. 2. One of the five
khandhas, or constitutional elements of physical life...".
'Suffering' is unavoidable since all 'things' are impermanent
(not-remaining = Skt. anitya). This impermanence has given rise to a lot
of esthetical expressions such as the inevitable withering of a flower, or
morning dew, etc. Often this theme of impermanence is emotionally
interpreted as the 'transitory nature of all things' through which a sense
of doom is evoked, e.g. in poetry. Yet anitya should be understood as
objectively neutral: if things where 'doomed' to perish or to disappear,
than enlightenment would not be a possibility. Even impermanence can
become a factor of enlightenment !
Besides this it is clear that every change in a 'subject' at the same time
means a change in the experienced 'object'. In this way anitya in fact
becomes a universal experience.
Things are impermanent because there can be no 'permanent' substance
('soul', 'atman', 'self', 'ego'). The 'elements of existence' (dharma) -
and therefore also the 'forms of existence' which are composed by these
elements - are 'self-less' (P. anatta). All that exists (the world of
experience) is self-less, without self, without permanence, without
absoluteness. This is the main criterion of the Teaching of the Buddha.
But : if there is no 'self', than who is it that suffers?
That which we call an 'individual', a 'personality', 'ego' or 'psyche', is
in fact no more than a convergence of events, impulses, thought
constructions, volitional actions, etc. In short, all that is
conventionally understood under the term "mental activity". This
collection (khandha, skandha) has no permanent substance or essence
(atman). Just as no permanent 'house-entity' is found in a constructed
house, in the same way no permanent 'entity' can be found within the
different forms of existence including sentient beings. This compound
nature of the forms of existence explains not only their impermanence but
also their 'artificiality', their com-positeness (together + to put) (sam-skri),
their polymer character.
The term 'samskara' has, as was mentioned before, a lot of meanings that
can not be confused with one another. Each of these possible meanings
however point to a compound nature, an aggregate; yet, the context in
which the term is used can differ. Therefore it is necessary to make a
clear distinction between its different uses: e.g. samskara is used to
denote the fourth of the five skandha's (aggregates) in which case the
connotations of 'karma' and 'will or volition' will be determining. When
it is used as the second link of the pratitya samutpada (dependent
co-origination), the emphasis will be put on the dynamic that runs from a
(past) volitional action towards its (future) result, the fruit which
conditions a future mental situation.
Every momentous 'being' is a compound of a series of ever-changing and
impermanent aggregates called the 'five aggregates' (pañca-skandha).
- rupa: form, corporeality
- vedana: feeling,
perception
- samjña: cognition,
conception
- samskara: volition,
karma-formations
- vijñana: consciousness,
discrimination
How difficult it is to give a proper translation or even an approach of
these terms becomes apparent from the multitude of (sometimes
contradictory) translations.
|
Author |
RUPA |
VEDANA |
SAMJNA |
SAMSKARA |
VIJNANA |
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S.
Bernard-Thierry |
corporeite |
sensations |
representations |
formations |
connaissance |
|
Edgerton |
physical form |
feeling, sensation |
notion, idea, conception |
predispositions |
(practical) knowledge |
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H.V.
Guenther |
expressive form |
feeling |
sensation |
motivation |
discrimination, psychological process, mentalism |
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H.
Inagaki |
matter, form |
perception |
conception |
volition |
consciousness |
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J.E.B.D. |
forms
of matter |
perception |
mental
conceptions and ideas |
volition |
consciousness of mind |
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D.
Kalupahana |
material form |
feeling |
perception |
dispositions |
consciousness |
|
M.
Monier-Williams |
bodily
forms |
sensation |
perception |
aggregates of formation |
consciousness or thought faculty |
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Nyanatiloka MT |
corporeality |
feeling |
perception |
mental
formations |
consciousness |
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PTSD |
material qualities |
feeling |
perception |
coefficients of consciousness |
consciousness |
|
W.
Rahula |
matiere |
sensations |
perception |
formations mentales |
conscience, connaissance |
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C.
Rhys-Davids |
the
seen-thing, body |
feeling |
perception |
activities, planning |
mind,
survivor |
|
Soothill (CSB) |
form,
sensuous quality |
reception, feeling, sensation |
thought, consciousness, perception |
action, mental activity |
cognition |
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D.T.
Suzuki |
material existence |
perception, sensation |
mental
perception and ideas |
volition and other related activities |
consciousness of mind |
|
J.
Takakusu |
form |
perception |
ideas/conception |
volition |
consciousness, mind |
|
comparative psychology |
'stimulus' |
'response' |
'conception' |
'drives' |
'learning' |
These five skandha's are stages of
perception, cognition and volition. They are NOT ontological elements.
They give an approach of the mental process that is active in the
'psyche'. We thus can look upon them as psychological/epistemological
elements.
It would therefore be wrong to
consider each of these skandha's as an 'entity', a 'being'. Not only are
they compound (ad infinitum), they also can not exist by themselves but
only in relation to and in function of the other skandha's. They are
therefore without substance and without autonomy, the two prerequisites
for the so-called 'atman'. Thus there is no 'atman'. Or to state it more
clearly: concentrating on or around the idea of an atman is (according to
Buddhist thought) an inefficient thought-error. Buddhism in all its forms
and aspects is an-atman (anatta): non-self.
This strict norm is the main criterion to separate things Buddhist from
things non-Buddhist.
Further: the fivefold classification of the personality into skandha's and
the twelve-fold classification of karmic existence (see later) are not a
"scientific neurological or neuro-psychological" analysis and make no
statements concerning an objective, anatomical reality. We are to look
upon these classifications as empirical 'expedient means' (upaya) used to
gain an insight into the process which leads from an 'existence
characterized by suffering' (samsara) to a state of 'non-suffering'
(nirvana). We are therefore clearly dealing with a soteriological
methodology and not with mere psychological data or metaphysical
statements.
The illusion to have or to be an atman - or even to take it into
consideration - is the deep origin of suffering. Suffering comes to an end
through the destruction of the atman-delusion (avidya = ignorance, mis-conception).
This delusion leads to desire (trisna, P. tanha = thirst) and hatred (dosa
= aversion), out of which the whole world of dissatisfaction or
unsatisfactoriness, in short 'duhkha' comes into existence.
The term 'desire, thirst' should not be interpreted to narrow, in the
sense of merely emotional or psychological. Desire encompasses 'all
beings'. So for instance we could say that 'the heart desires to beat'
seeing that this is the hearts necessary function. We can even speak of a
certain 'cosmic' desire, e.g. as is seen in the mutual attraction of two
masses (Newton's Law). Seen as such, desire is not only the motive or
drive of the individual, it can also be transposed to a collectivity, yes
even cosmically as the drive or the motive of the universe.
This all leads us to conclude that 'suffering' has its origin in 'desire',
which in its turn has its source in 'ignorance'. To often however this is
interpreted as "my suffering has its origin in my desire which in its turn
finds its source in my ignorance". Such an expression leads to irrelevant
questions concerning e.g. the suffering of innocent children. This
mistaken shifting of emphasis is based on the input of the concept of
'mine' there where 'it' is meant. The reduction to individuality is in
contradiction with the presupposition of anatman or 'no-self' and leads to
a methodological incoherence. In our discussion of causality (next
chapter) we should continuously take this into account with every step in
our train of thought.
This makes that the Third and Fourth
Noble Truths should consequently be interpreted in a purely soteriological
and pragmatic (i.e. effective) way. A further consequence of the anatman-idea
is than that all concepts, all ideas, all forms of thought are anatman,
and therefore have no absolute or adequate sense, i.e. they can only be
understood as being relative (i.e. in relation to). Further: anatman is
also applied to anatman, meaning even anatman is relative: it is only a
form of expression in which the content is relative, interchangeable,
impermanent. From this the concept of 'emptiness' (sunyata) originated.
However, also the concept of sunyata is a mere concept.....therefore.....
Buddhist philosophy than will
primarily be an epistemology, a philosophy of knowing and Buddhist
soteriology will be a wisdom of knowing: seeing things as they are in se,
in their emptiness, and not as they appear to our existential
consciousness.
In relation to this we could mutatis mutandis point to an analogy with
"Gestalt Psychology", which has phenomenological data (Gegebenheiten) as
its basis. "We do not perceive the world as it is, but as we are." The
'perceiver' organizes his/her own world of experience out of or around
his/her own attitude.
To give a structure or a soteriological efficiency to such
"emptiness-thinking", we can make use of several keys or paradigms with
which we can solve the apparent unacceptability's or paradoxes. Most used
in relation hereto are:
(1) the logical tetralemma, which forms the basis of the Buddhist
fourfold logic :
a. A is
b. A is not
c. A is, and is not
d. A neither is, nor is not
In which the final and definitive emphasis is put on (d.). Where
paradoxes occur (e.g. in the question of self/no-self) the thought
process should - if possible - extend to the fourth lemma (d.) i.e.
"neither self, nor no-self".
(2) the threefold level in relation to 'person', based on a centrifugal
perspective:
a. personal
b. transpersonal
c. impersonal
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